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Affective polarization (AP)—the tendency of political partisans to view their opponents as a stigmatized “out group”—is now a major field of research. Relevant evidence in the United States derives primarily from a single source, the American National Election Studies (ANES) feeling thermometer time series. We investigate whether the design of the ANES produces overestimates of AP. We consider four mechanisms: overrepresentation of strong partisans, selection bias conditional on strong identification, priming effects of partisan content, and survey mode variation. Our analysis uses the first-ever collaboration between ANES and the General Social Survey and a novel experiment that manipulates the amount of political content in surveys. Our tests show that variation in survey mode has caused an artificial increase in the mixed-mode ANES time series, but the general increase in out-party animus is nonetheless real and not merely an artifact of selection bias or priming effects. 

Abstract Rising costs and challenges of in-person interviewing have prompted major surveys to consider moving online and conducting live web-based video interviews. In this paper, we evaluate video mode effects using a two-wave experimental design in which respondents were randomized to either an interviewer-administered video or interviewer-administered in-person survey waveaftercompleting a self-administered online survey wave. This design permits testing of both within- and between-subject differences across survey modes. Our findings suggest that video interviewing is more comparable to in-person interviewing than online interviewing across multiple measures of satisficing, social desirability, and respondent satisfaction. 

We use survey experiments to test the validity of judicial assumptions underlying campaign finance regulation. Our evidence supports the key assumption that ‘‘appearance of corruption’’ is directly related to the monetary value of campaign contributions. Contrary to the Court’s reasoning in Buckley v. Valeo and Citizens United v. FEC, independent expenditures are more likely to elicit the appearance of corruption than direct contributions, and direct contributions well below the legal limit also create the appearance of corruption. Our findings therefore call into question key legal tenets underlying campaign finance regulation and suggest that the amounts raised by virtually every federal election campaign exceed the thresh-old required to elicit widespread public perceptions of corruption.